

Communication Rights in the Information Society: Democratization of Communication as Social Movement?

Introduction

The campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society, commonly known as the *CRIS Campaign*, was initiated in 2001 by the Platform for Communication Rights, a transnational group of NGOs and individuals involved in policy advocacy around global media and communication issues. It is a far-reaching initiative, both in its attempt to develop consensual knowledge around a concept of “communication rights,” and in its use of that term as the basis for addressing a broad range of communication-information issues. The campaign can be understood as the political offshoot of the critical communication scholarship of the 1960s and ‘70s (e.g., Habermas 1970; Hamelink 1979). The idea of communication rights has a two-pronged connection to democratic governance: one concerns the contribution of communication to democracy directly (in the sense of participation and voice), the other concerns the way policies regarding communication infrastructures and systems can promote democratic ideals.

Understanding the CRIS Campaign requires analysis of four interdependent elements:

- 1) Its ideology regarding “communication rights”
- 2) Its historical links to the MacBride Commission and the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates of the 1970s and 1980s;
- 3) Its origin as a “campaign” focused on the political opportunity created by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and its strategy of leveraging its close connections to UN institutions to both facilitate and shape the participation of civil society in the WSIS process; and
- 4) Its organizational and funding support from ecumenical, social-democratic Christian groups in Europe

Defining the “Right to Communicate”

The first question to emerge in all discussions of the CRIS Campaign is: what is the meaning of “communication rights”? The answer is not simple. Understandings of the concept vary even among active participants in the campaign. But the core ideas underlying the CRIS Campaign have formed the basis of an intellectual and political movement for the past 35 years, and most of its principal actors are rooted in academia. One can therefore speak of an *ideology* underlying the campaign.

The *right to communicate* is a general norm based on ideals of participatory democracy. It asserts that all citizens must have a say, a communication right, in any and every governance process that affects them. It believes that a “right to hear and be heard, to inform and be informed,”¹ and “to participate in public communication”² should be the touchstone of communication policy. These are presented as a “new human right” that expands and supersedes the individual rights of freedom of speech, the press, and assembly associated with classical liberalism. Free expression, communication rights (CR) advocates believe, is enhanced by constructing an environment that facilitates full, well-rounded human communication. The environmental factors that realize “communication rights” are rather sweeping, including such things as improved education, “a diverse and independent media,” the “elimination of prejudice, hatred, discrimination and intolerance,” and the “promotion of cultural and social self-determination.” Theorists of CR contend that these broader “flanking” conditions enhance liberal freedoms, and thus their writings do not dwell on how conflicts between them might arise, or how they would want to see such conflicts resolved.

The most serious ideological issue in communication rights is its persistent lack of clarity about whether it is an individual right or a collective right. (e.g., MacBride Commission 1980; McIver, Rasmussen et al. 2004) Theorists routinely claim that it is both. The UNESCO medium-term plan for 1984-89 is typical, defining the right to communicate as

¹ Telecommission of Canada, *Instant World* (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971), p. 4; cited in McIver et al, 2004.

² MacBride Commission (1980). *Many voices, one world: Communication and society. Today and tomorrow*. Paris/London, UNESCO/Kogan Page.

“a fundamental right of the individual and...a collective right, guaranteed to all communities and all nations.” There is very little analysis of the contradictions and ambiguities that such a combination creates.³ Communities, nations and individuals can and often do assert conflicting claims against each other in numerous areas of communication-information policy (such as public security vs. privacy and free expression, or in cultural and religious conflicts over educational policy). It is, moreover, not just a theoretical problem. Tensions between individual and collective formulations of the right to communicate caused the movement considerable grief during the NWICO episode, and continue to generate controversies today.

The breadth and incompleteness of the “communication rights” ideology sustains three different worldviews, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting, each associated with different people and organizations involved with CRIS.

The “legalistic” worldview

One perspective, best represented today by Dutch communication scholar Cees Hamelink, wishes to see a universal “Right to Communicate” become part of international law. This worldview is legal and institutional; it is conceived of as an elaboration and improvement of the basic human rights enshrined in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This appears to have been the original worldview. The phrase “right to communicate” was coined in 1969 by Jean d’Arcy, an official at the UN Office of Public Information and a leader of TV development in France. The development of that idea occurred throughout the 1970s in tandem with the awareness of the transformative potential of interactive telecommunication technologies. In the 1970s, Hamelink and other intellectuals gained a base of institutional support in UNESCO and spent more than a decade developing and promoting the concept of a right to communicate. They succeeded in linking the idea to the non-aligned nation’s push for a “New World Information and Communication Order” (NWICO) in the Cold War years of the 1970s and early 1980s, and gained recognition for it in UNESCO declarations and the 1980 MacBride Commission Report (see historical section below). From a state-

³ Hamelink, 1998

centered perspective, this worldview promotes the creation of a new legal instrument, with explicit measurement or verification potential.⁴ From a civil society perspective, it is a view emerging from the MacBride Roundtables and academic communication scholarship in the 1980s and '90s.

Hamelink has developed a manifesto enumerating the implications of a universal right to communicate. (See Appendix 1) It was delivered at the WSIS Plenary during Phase 1 and has since been widely circulated. Hamelink's enumeration sets out a sweeping set of entitlements, both positive and negative.⁵ The rights set out there, precisely because they are more concrete than most other discussions, reveal some of the conceptual problems alluded to above: they have unclear boundaries relative to other key human rights, such as privacy, free expression, and property, and their internal consistency could be questioned.

The liberal worldview

A second viewpoint is favorably disposed toward the banner of a "right to communicate" but thinks of it in ways more consonant with classical liberalism. In this worldview, *communication rights* is basically a new label for traditional, but still vital and evolving informational and communicative civil liberties. The CRIS Campaign's charter, which speaks of "Reclaiming Civil and Political Rights," invites this reading. D'Arcy himself argued that collections of freedoms representing separate spheres of communication – assembly, speech, press – needed to be grouped under "a positive human right encompassing all these freedoms and more. The right to communicate would serve as an umbrella of an 'ascending progression' of rights and freedoms." (D'Arcy 1983)

But for advocates of the full interpretation, application, and implementation of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the creation of a new legal instrument for communication rights is problematic. They prefer to work within the framework of the still not fully realized

⁴ See <http://www.righttocommunicate.org/viewGroup.atm?sectionName=rights&id=3>

⁵ See also Hamelink, C. 1998. "Human Rights in Cyberspace." UN Chronicle. (on individual vs. collective rights) <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=283>

potential of Article 19.⁶ They have also called attention to tensions or contradictions between some formulations of the right to communicate and prior concepts of freedom of expression. Some of Hamelink’s “protection rights,” for example, could be used to rationalize censorship. The UK-based transnational NGO Article 19 publicly criticized a CRIS declaration on the right to communicate as having the potential to weaken or endanger the freedom of opinion and expression provisions of the UDHR.⁷ Likewise, the assertion of “collective rights” over all development and applications of communication technologies and infrastructures has great potential to conflict with traditional liberal notions of communicative freedom.

Once again we are led to the distinction between individual and collective rights. There is an inherent tension between the liberal worldview, which seeks to protect humans as individuals from forms of control and repression that could just as easily come from democratic processes as from any other source, and the collectivist, egalitarian thrust of other worldviews comprising the campaign. Liberal sympathizers with the communication rights perspective, such as Article XIX’s Law Programme Director, emphasize the complementary relationship between freedom of expression and the broader set of “flanking” rights advocated by CRIS, saying that they are “cumulatively, more than the sum of their parts.” Liberal detractors, such as the World Press Freedom Committee, see communication rights as a “code word” for greater regulation of freedom of expression.⁸

The (dominant) normative-tactical worldview

A third view of communication rights, a position most clearly articulated by CRIS Campaign director Seán Ó Siochrú, sees it as a broad normative banner and the language

⁶ Article 19 holds that: “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

⁷ See “Article 19 critiques draft declaration on the Right to Communicate.”

<http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/33439>. CRIS Response: “CRIS and the right to communicate: A brief response to Article 19.”

http://www.crisinfo.org/index.php/newsroom/cris/cris_and_the_right_to_communicate_a_brief_response_to_article_19

⁸ Marilyn Greene (ed.), New Code Words for Censorship: Modern Labels for Curbs on the Press. Reston, VA: World Press Freedom Committee. 2000.

of “rights” more as a framing tactic than as something to be taken literally and applied legalistically. This worldview steps away from the legacy of d’Arcy and openly acknowledges, even embraces, the lack of precision in the norm. It is the very incompleteness of the idea that makes it possible to serve as a banner that can be waved by neomarxists, feminists, liberals, human rights advocates, social democrats and many other social movements involved in communication-information policy.

Ó Siochrú believes that using communication rights in this way facilitates the ongoing development of consensual knowledge among non-state actors about communication policy issues. The indivisibility of rights will necessarily generate conflicts around norms of communications rights, and these conflicts need to be accommodated. Advocates who wish to move away from a legalistic framework for the adoption and diffusion of communication rights welcome these conflicts as deliberative and rhetorical opportunities that lend themselves to the consolidation of a position that is more reformist than radical, and more likely to convey persuasive evidence to state targets both domestically and in international institutions. Consolidating a civil society position on communication rights is a legitimizing exercise, a prerequisite to institutional influence given the vast uncertainty around a norm of communication rights.

Despite CRIS’s historical ties to the legalistic view and its partnerships with civil society actors holding more liberal views, it is this third worldview that seems to be held by CRIS’s most influential actors. Prior to the inception of the campaign, what is now the Platform for Communication Rights was first called the “Platform for Cooperation on Communication and Democratization,” then the “Platform for Democratization of Communication.” Why this substitution of the term *communication rights* for *democratization*? According to APC’s Anriette Esterhuysen, normative and tactical considerations were central. Esterhuysen noted the lack of a “language of solidarity in the information and communication field” at the time of the Campaign’s inception. The organizations involved appropriated the language of “rights” in order to facilitate a “shared identity” among all the different struggles going on in the CIP realm.⁹ Similarly,

⁹ Ibid.

Sally Burch of ALAI in Ecuador explained that early on the WSIS process was characterized by a very “technocratic” approach to the issues, emphasizing infrastructure construction and technology diffusion. The initiators of what became the campaign wanted to broaden the WSIS discussion and to make sure human rights and social issues were confronted. It was therefore a tactical move to frame the discussion using the language of rights.¹⁰ Nevertheless, CRIS educational materials continue to retell the history of the term and to reproduce, in a contemporary setting, the ideology of communication rights as it was developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s at UNESCO.¹¹ Usage of the term thus provides a dual function, serving as a broad normative banner but also linking those who care to pursue the ideas to the more developed ideology underlying the term.

Ó Siochrú reflects that:

“A *right to communicate* is now sometimes used interchangeably with *communication rights*. As a term, *communication rights* is less legalistic. The CRIS Campaign...has [moved] away from a Right to Communicate that focuses on international law. This is not to deny that international law should make reference to the right to communicate; but rather that it is not a useful or strategic demand at this point and indeed that its pursuit could be counterproductive. The difference might be seen in switching from arguing that: ‘everyone should have a Right to Communicate and it should be codified in international law’ to the more colloquial use of rights as in: ‘everyone has a right to communicate and it should therefore be protected and enforced.’”¹²

The tactical appropriation of rights language comes at a price, however. Sidestepping the issue of what communication rights actually are blunts the campaign’s ability to develop and propose concrete institutional changes; advocacy remains at the normative level. And when specific changes in laws are on the table, the real and important political

¹⁰ See Heinrich-Boell Foundation (2005). WSIS as a case of information capitalism? Critical Perspectives at Incommunicado Conference. See also the news release in Nov. 2001 announcing the launch of the CRIS Campaign, available at http://www.cmn.ie/cmnsitenew/current/march2002/comm_rights_cris2.htm

¹¹ June 2005 workbook.

¹² Email communication with Christiane Page, July 2004.

differences regarding how rights conflicts might be worked out, or between individualist and collectivist conceptions, will inevitably surface.

At its core, the CRIS Campaign's ideology is based more on ideals of participatory democracy than on a rights framework as that term is normally used in liberal discourse. In other words, the "democratization" label that preceded CRIS was a more accurate if less potent and broadly appealing term for the group's agenda. As Hamelink asserts, "communication processes belong to a much broader domain than that covered by a right to freedom of information. The right to communicate addresses the core of the democratic process as well as the essence of most social and personal relations."¹³ Such an all-encompassing ideological framework can serve as a powerful motivator of collective action in the same way that religious ideals can, but leaves to others the problem of translating them into implementable legal and institutional forms.

Historical Legacy: From NWICO to WSIS

Whatever one thinks of the ideology of the CRIS Campaign, one must appreciate the historical rootedness, continuity, and persistence of its core advocates. There is a direct lineage between CRIS and the tumultuous battles in the United Nations over a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) of the 1970s and the controversial 1980 UNESCO report promoting NWICO. If we trace this evolution over the full 35-year period, we find consistency in the political goals and type of policies advocated, but an important, thought-provoking change in the nature of the actors driving the process – a shift from state actors to civil society actors.

D'Arcy and the right to communicate

The phrase *right to communicate*, as noted before, originated with Jean d'Arcy in 1969 and was originally conceived as a "new human right" to be implemented in international law. The current CRIS Campaign, with its normative-tactical use of the term and its shift from states to social movements and civil society, has stepped decisively away from that legacy. At the same time, their conscious appropriation of the label ratifies the link to the

¹³ Hamelink, "CRIS and the Right to Communicate: A Brief Response to Article 19," CRIS Newsroom, URL: <http://www.crisinfo.org/content/view/full/157>

original movement and makes it inescapable. Therefore we briefly recount the D'Arcy legacy while recognizing the evolution and change that have taken place.¹⁴

In 1965, d'Arcy attended a UN conference of experts to advise the newly formed satellite communication organization INTELSAT. Communications visionary Arthur C. Clarke, a good friend of D'Arcy's, was the keynote speaker. Like many others at the time, D'Arcy thought that new technology was making it possible for people to participate interactively in all the social processes that affected them. The emergence of these new interactive communication capabilities altered the nature of state sovereignty over communication services. The rights of ordinary people now able to horizontally participate in decision-making processes needed to be guaranteed and protected in new ways – but the UDHR's Article 19 was perceived as inadequate for that task. D'Arcy concluded that "...the time will come when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will have to encompass a more extensive right than man's right to information...This is the right of men to communicate." (D'Arcy 1969, p. 14). D'Arcy's analysis galvanized an intellectual movement around a "right to communicate."

D'Arcy was active for almost two decades in defining what he meant by the implication of person-to-person communication and the need for a break with traditional freedom of expression rights. He made the foundation for his argument most explicit in 1983, in a prologue for a book on the right to communicate. (D'Arcy 1983) There, d'Arcy tried to link democratic governance issues of electronic universal communications to a new universal right to communicate. He argued that freedom of expression rights, given their foundation in a print and broadcasting context, were anointed with a "mass media mentality" that conditioned people and citizens for more than a hundred years to accept as "normal and ineluctable" a top-down flow of non-diversified information. (D'Arcy 1983p. xxii). This mode of communication was structurally perpetuated by mutually-reinforcing domestic and international communications regulatory regimes. But the advent of a new structurally unified world system of communication, he believed,

¹⁴ McIver et al. (2004) provide one of the most current and useful accounts of D'Arcy's role in laying the foundational ideas and conditions that set advocacy around communication rights on a particular historical path. For other scholarly accounts, See also Harms, Richstad and Kie, 1977; Birdsall, W.F., 1998 and 2003.

warranted a radical break with traditional concepts of freedom of expression and its expansion into a broader right to communicate that would allow full citizen interaction with all governance processes.

These idealistic visions made their way into policy elites and international academic circles, especially in communication and journalism studies. In 1973 D'Arcy was the keynote speaker at the annual meeting of the International Institute of Communication (IIC), an association for professionals, academics and policy makers in the field. Subsequent meetings of the IIC dealt with attempts to define a right to communicate for the next 10 years. A Right to Communicate Group was formed in 1974 and a Fund and Secretariat established at the University of Hawaii in Honolulu.¹⁵ The concept also found an institutional base of support in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It was officially inscribed in UNESCO rhetoric at its 1974 General Conference when Sweden succeeded in getting a resolution adopted on “the right to communicate” as “an overarching principle under which problems relating to mass media might be analyzed and corrective measures proposed.”¹⁶ (Carlsson, 2003) With the passage of this resolution, the initiative to formulate a definition moved to UNESCO's Division of Free Flow of Information and Communication.

Communication Rights and Geopolitical Power Politics

It is at this critical juncture that the attempt to formulate a right to communicate becomes linked, ideologically, politically and institutionally, with the non-aligned nations' movement of the 1970's and the NWICO debate. The non-aligned nations' movement (NAM) consisted of about 90 UN member states – most of them developing nations whose liberation from colonialism in the 1950s and '60s altered the balance of power in the UN system. Refusing to side with either the Soviet Union or the United States in the Cold War, these countries sought a new international economic order and later, as an extension of those demands, a new world information and communication order. (Carlsson, 2003) Those calling for this new order pitted their demands directly against the

¹⁵ The group, which disbanded in the early 1980s, was revived in 2001 and now runs a very informative website, www.righttocommunicate.org.

¹⁶ UNESCO Resolution 4.121: Right to Communicate, 1974. Text available at <http://www.righttocommunicate.org/viewDocument.atm?sectionName=rights&id=2>

post-World War II doctrine of the “free flow of information” promulgated by the United States. The nonaligned countries rejected the free flow doctrine, viewing it as a rationalization for dominance of international media systems by Western, mainly American, commercial interests. Academic studies documented that motion pictures and other media content flowed primarily from the US and other major developed countries and not in the other direction. (e.g., Nordenstreng and Varis 1974, etc.) New satellite technologies able to reach across the globe, according to NAM, threatened to increase North-South imbalances and foster a “cultural imperialism” through news and entertainment media.

While anti-capitalist academics in Europe and the US rallied to the support of NWICO, many western journalists and civil libertarians greeted it suspiciously, wary of the potential of demands for more “balanced” information flows to serve as a cover for assertions of state control over news and information, or for undermining the independence of journalists.¹⁷ The advocates of communication rights contributed to this concern by fudging the issue of whether the right to communicate was individual or collective. The state-based NWICO adherents were putting forth a collective, sovereignty-based concept of communication rights.¹⁸ In historical context, it was not unreasonable to see that as a threat to individual rights of freedom of expression and access to information – especially in the developing world of the 1970s, where national governments commonly asserted their desire to control news flows into and out of their country and democratic institutions and liberal freedoms were often weak and unstable.

The MacBride Commission was formed in 1977 in response to these conflicts. Officially known as the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, it was chaired by Seán MacBride (b. 1904, d. 1988), an Irish politician and human rights

¹⁷ World Press Freedom Committee (1981). Declaration of Talloires. Available on the web at: <http://www.wpfc.org/site/docs/pdf/Publications/Declaration%20of%20Talloires.pdf> As an indication of how divisive the issue could be, Jean d’Arcy himself is listed as a signatory of the Talloire Declaration, thus he apparently join the chorus of NWICO critics.

¹⁸ In his Mauve Paper, for example, Hamelink (1979) defined a new international information order as: “an international exchange of information in which states, which develop their cultural systems in an autonomous way and with complete sovereign control of resources, fully and effectively participate as independent members of the international community.” In this formulation the relevant unit of analysis, and holder of communication rights, are states.

advocate who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974. D’Arcy himself and the intellectual movement around the right to communicate influenced the MacBride Commission process. D’Arcy participated directly in meetings of the Commission in 1979,¹⁹ and both d’Arcy (1978) and Hamelink (1979) were among the experts engaged by UNESCO to produce specialized reports, known as the Mauve Papers, on various aspects of the Commission’s work (Carlsson, 2003; Harley, 2003).

In the final report of the MacBride Commission, the NWICO demands of developing nations were carefully filtered through the language and concerns of human rights. Ultimately, however, the Commission’s Report was interpreted in contextual and geopolitical terms, not through a careful reading of its text. It was taken, first, as endorsement of the developing nations’ demands for a NWICO, and second (despite many careful assurances and substantive proposals promoting free expression) as an attack on traditional principles of freedom of information and expression. With its criticism of advertising-support and commercialism in the media, it also guaranteed opposition from the powerful commercial media in the West. As such, it received a hostile reception in the United States. The US (in 1984) and Great Britain (in 1985) withdrew their membership and financial support from UNESCO, as the conservative nationalists of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations capitalized on the negative perceptions of the MacBride Report to make a political point. By 1989, with the end of the UNESCO 1982-89 plan, the concept of a right to communicate was stricken from the agenda of the chastened international organization.

Rise of the CR Phoenix

Where state actors left-off, non-state actors – journalists, activists and academics – took up advocacy around “a right to communicate.” This most clearly occurred with the MacBride Roundtable, which was created in 1989 to stimulate discussion of issues

¹⁹ “Since Beuve-Mery [the French Commissioner] virtually never spoke, D’Arcy’s insights into communication issues —satellites, WARC [World Administrative Radio Conference], UN/UNESCO media matters and the like—provided a substantial plus” (Harley 1993, p. 114). But d’Arcy’s commitment to communication rights was not always consistent. At the 6th meeting of the commission in Acapulco, also in 1979, he “dropped a bomb” when he suggested that the commission support WARC’s 79 position opposing the use of short wave frequencies for international broadcasting, noting that the practice was a continuous source of aggravation in international relations, a comment said to have stunned the commission. (Harley, 2003)

embodied in the Commission's controversial 1980 report. Led by Richard Vincent of the University of Hawaii and Seán Ó Siochrú, it consisted of about 30 regular attendees drawn from the ranks of academia, developing country journalists, former MacBride Commissioners and other interested policy makers. For ten years, the Roundtables met annually. The records of these meetings, which are available online, document the participants' support for the ideas contained in the 1980 Report, and the shift from governmental to nongovernmental organizations.

Several other transnational activist networks concerned with communication-information policy were founded in the 1980s. Notable organizations as they relate to the later emergence of the CRIS Campaign include the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), founded in 1983, Vidéazimut, founded in 1989,²⁰ and the Association for Progressive Communications, which emerged from 1987-1990. Within this ecology a small but dedicated network of activist-intellectuals – Hamelink, Ó Siochrú, Bruce Girard, George Gerbner, Robert McChesney, Alain Ambrosi, Kaarl Nordenstreng, Mark Raboy, Pradip Thomas, Richard Vincent, Dee Dee Halleck and Michael Eisenmenger, to cite some of the most central – gained strength and confidence even as the world's communication policies turned in a direction they loathed: toward liberalization, markets and competition. Various permutations of these individuals, the groups they founded and the manifestos they issued combine and recombine in the mid-to-late 1990s: The Peoples Communication Charter (drafted by Hamelink in 1996)²¹; The Platform for Cooperation on Democratisation and Communication in London in 1996 (led by Ó Siochrú); Voices 21, a loose transnational umbrella association of the mostly the same academics and advocates, which issued the 1999 statement “A Global Movement for People's Voices in the 21st Century.”

By the time of its 1997 meeting, the MacBride Roundtable meeting record is able to report with obvious satisfaction that:

²⁰ Vidéazimut was an International Coalition for Democratic Communication with about 75 members located in about 35 countries in all continents, and was active until the late 1990s.

²¹ The People's Communication Charter was an initiative of the Centre for Communication & Human Rights (Amsterdam, the Netherlands), the Third World Network (Penang, Malaysia), the Cultural Environment Movement (USA), and the AMARC-World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (Peru/Canada). The Charter is available at <http://www.pccharter.net/charteren.html>

“The various components of an international movement on media and communications, that can challenge the current neo-liberal orthodoxy, seem to be emerging. The creation of a global social movement - largely absent from the NWICO - requires a number of factors, among them a core constituency of on-the-ground activists who recognise their affinities and can mobilize in concerted actions; an understanding of the key global issues of the day and of the arenas in which they are fought out; and the capacity to get their message out both to natural allies in progressive movements and to the general public.” (The MacBride Roundtable 1997).

WSIS as Mobilizing Structure

The CRIS campaign was formed because of the political opportunity presented by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). WSIS civil society (hereafter, *WSIS-CS*) became the campaign’s basic mobilizing structure. WSIS created an opportunity for global engagement with international organizations and governments around communication-information policy, as well as for funding and publicity efforts. One of the most important and impressive aspects of CRIS as an organization is its co-evolution with the WSIS process itself. The campaign’s principal actors played an important role in proposing, defining and operating the very structures through which civil society participated in WSIS.

The Timeline (Figure 1, next page) documents the sequence. As the Campaign’s Marc Raboy (2004, 95) has written, the massive demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle in 1999 created a general concern among international organizations about their legitimacy, creating a demand for greater inclusion of civil society actors. The actors and organizations behind CRIS, who had already come together around the *Platform for Democratization of Communication* and *Voices 21*, were well-positioned to respond to this opening. Plans for a World Summit, which put into global play policies regarding the development and construction of an “information society,” provided a perfect focal point for mobilization: an ideal environment in which to advance a broad norm such as




Figure 1: Communications Rights Timeline

communication rights, recruit new activists and influence established ones not already a part of their network. At the same time, their status as NGOs focused on communication-information issues and experienced in the workings of international organizations proved useful to the Summit organizers' need for legitimacy and widespread participation.

The *Platform/Voices 21* activists became aware of the plans for WSIS in December 2000, when a senior ITU official speaking at a community networking workshop informed them of the proposed Summit and, reflecting the post-Seattle mood, emphasized the need for civil society involvement to make it a success. The ITU official's invitation "sparked the imagination" of certain activists (Raboy, 2004, 95), prompting them to revive the *Platform* and form a working group to monitor the progress of World Summit plans. The CRIS Campaign was born came during a *Platform* meeting in October 2001 at the London offices of the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC). The hope was that the Summit would "offer an opportunity to put communication rights on the global agenda." (Girard, 2002) Only a month later, the Campaign got funding from a German foundation to hold a conference in Geneva, the center of international organizations and WSIS planning, designed to create opportunities to push the agenda of WSIS towards human rights, and to interact with representatives from the WSIS Secretariat, ITU and UNESCO on the question of civil society participation.²²

²² See Tracking Magazine (2002). Communication Rights in the Information Society:

The plan behind the November 2001 Geneva conference worked. Still in the early stages of WSIS planning, Summit organizers, though committed (rhetorically) to a “tripartite Summit” in which civil society, business and governments would interact more or less as peers, had no idea how to execute that concept.²³ How would civil society organizations be accredited? Who would represent them in speeches and discussions? To what degree would civil society representatives, or individual actors from civil society in unmediated form, participate in decision making and in the drafting of the WSIS Declaration and Plan of Action? Seizing the moment, CRIS activists put themselves forward as intermediaries who could develop proposals for civil society participation in the WSIS. Within two months they were duly commissioned by the WSIS Secretariat to do just that.²⁴ CRIS was given a chance to enact its norms regarding participatory governance on a grand scale. Though ultimately frustrated and disappointed by governments’ refusal to make good on their assurances that civil society would be included as an equal partner,²⁵ the organization of civil society in WSIS Phase 1 bears the distinct imprint of CRIS’s proposals and its Herculean efforts to realize them.

The basic structure of civil society in WSIS is outlined in Figure 2 below. Fundamentally, during Phase 1 WSIS-CS came to be organized around self-formed thematic and regional caucuses,²⁶ with two key organs of collective action across these domains. The two integrative organs were the Content and Themes group, which developed statements and

A Platform initiative for the WSIS. The Campaign’s news release described it as “an opportunity for media NGOs and public service media to develop positions and put them to the WSIS.” Available at http://www.cmn.ie/cmnsitenew/current/march2002/comm_rights_cris2.htm

²³ “Highlights of the CRIS Campaign,” *Media Development* 2002/4, http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/publications/media_development/2002_4/highlights_of_the_cris_campaign

²⁴ See Comunex, “Civil Society Participation in the WSIS,” <http://comunex.comunica.org/wsisis/>. See also Sean O’Siochru and Bruce Girard, “Report of Working Group on Civil Society Participation: ‘Process’” UNESCO WSIS Civil Society Consultation, Paris, 22nd and 23rd April, 2002.

²⁵ At Prepcom 1 in July 2002, 30 CRIS members arrived “with goodwill and optimism” but discovered that they would not be full partners in WSIS. CS was excluded from most of the important centers of decision making. CRIS and the CRIS-led CS plenary decided to continue to participate in the WSIS process “on the basis of skeptical engagement.” See O’Siochru and “Highlights”, 2002

²⁶ Examples are the Human Rights Caucus, the Patents, Copyright and Trademark Working Group, the Media Caucus, Community Media Caucus, etc., as well as regional caucuses for Africa, Latin America, Europe and others. The caucuses as of mid-2005 were listed at <http://www.wsis-cs.org/caucuses.html>.

documents as official civil society input into the process, and the Civil Society Plenary, a physical and virtual assembly which nominally held the role of “ultimate civil society




Figure 2: WSIS Organizational Structure

authority in the WSIS process.” The Content and Themes group was coordinated by CRIS principals Sally Burch and William McIver; the Plenary was coordinated by APC’s Karen Banks, also a key member of Content and Themes. The email communication lists of both organs were hosted by APC’s GreenNet and administered by Banks. A third

organ for collective action across civil society, the Civil Society Bureau (CSB), was proposed by the Civil Society Secretariat as a formal body composed of officially designated representatives from different civil society sectors, called “families.” It was intended to serve as the official interface with the UN bureaucracy. Its status as a representative body, however, was contested and eventually eviscerated, as the number of arbitrarily-defined “family” groups ballooned from 12 to 21, procedures for selecting representatives were never defined (the title “representative” was replaced by the term “focal points”), procedures for creating new families or eliminating atrophied ones were never created, and its authority was limited to procedural and logistical matters.²⁷ The CSB structure was thus almost completely disconnected from the thematic caucuses and the plenary.²⁸ It operated in isolation from the mainstream of WSIS-CS as a result, and held little sway over the opinions or allegiance of WSIS-CS participants.

The institutional problems that were most evident in the CSB were in fact endemic to WSIS-CS. Throughout most of these structures there were no formalized mechanisms for electing or regularly replacing representatives, coordinators or chairs. Decision making processes were usually improvised – at best, consensual, at worst somewhat manipulated. The basic model of decentralized, self-selected caucuses held together by consensual decision making in an open plenary was workable only insofar as participation was confined to a small and ideologically compatible group of transnational advocacy networks. As soon as these structures were confronted with larger-scale participation and real ideological and political differences, they proved unwieldy. In that environment, the Content and Themes group emerged as the real power behind WSIS-CS’s voice,²⁹ and that group was clearly controlled by CRIS principals and allies. Serving in that leadership capacity, and shut out from direct participation with governments in formulating the official WSIS documents, the Content and Themes group facilitated the drafting of a

²⁷ For a listing of the WSIS “Families” see <http://www.un-ngls.org/wsis--csb--families.htm>.

²⁸ Ronald Koven of the World Press Freedom Committee, charges that CRIS deliberately undermined the authority of the CSB because it could not control it. See “Controls in Cyberspace,” WPCF, <http://www.wpcf.org/index.jsp?page=Statement%20Controls%20in%20Cyberspace%20RK.html>

²⁹ Any accredited civil society group could in principle submit their own statements to the WSIS Secretariat, but in actual practice C&T had much more clout.

“Civil Society Declaration” – a parallel and alternative definition of the norms and policies of the information society.³⁰

Two concluding observations regarding the co-evolutionary relationship between WSIS-CS and the CRIS Campaign are in order:

First, because of its first-mover advantage in negotiating civil society’s role and in navigating the civil society segments of the WSIS bureaucracies, CRIS and CRIS-affiliated actors achieved prominence and influence over WSIS-CS’s organs of deliberation and decision-making. To be sure, the decentralized, open structures of WSIS-CS at the ground level promoted and protected autonomous mobilization and participation, as CRIS had intended. On the other hand the goal of a Summit in which WSIS-CS would be an influential player created an imperative for coordinated, collective responses from “Civil Society” as a sector (if that concept is meaningful). To the extent that “Civil Society” had any capacity to issue statements and coordinate action in WSIS Phase 1, the network of CRIS and APC actors provided much of the connective tissue, if not most of the actual content. (See the Social Network Analysis section for a graphic demonstration.)

Second, and more fundamentally, the CRIS-inspired plan for civil society participation in WSIS did not come to grips with the structural and political problems posed by any attempt to institutionalize participation by non-state actors in international policy making. The CRIS proposals seemed to be animated, instead, by two simpler objectives: 1) a desire to mobilize the kind of transnational activist networks and NGOs with which it was familiar and compatible, and 2) a desire to ensure that those networks and NGOs would be heard in WSIS processes and deliberations. Its plans thus emphasized opportunities for mobilization and structures for self-organization and self-expression, but avoided almost completely the problem of creating mechanisms for legitimate representation and collective decision-making. Indeed, the hostile reception accorded the plans for a CSB may indicate that this was perceived as a feature, not a bug. But by the

³⁰ Civil Society Declaration reference.

end of the first phase of WSIS it had become evident that the longer-term institutional issues could not be avoided; the absence of decision making mechanisms continuously ground away at WSIS-CS's capacity and legitimacy. Midway into the second phase of WSIS, Ó Siochrú could, to his credit, openly admit "We believe there is still a major legitimacy deficit in the whole of civil society structures."³¹

Overall, however, governments' unwillingness to deliver equal status to civil society actors in WSIS and CRIS's failure to develop proposals that dealt with the deeper problems of institutionalizing public participation should not obscure its tremendous success at using WSIS Phase 1 as a mobilizing structure. It is already evident that CRIS as an initiative will continue beyond WSIS.

Organizational Structure and Process

The CRIS Campaign is run by an Executive Secretariat, in which O' Siochru and WACC's Myriam Horngren figure most prominently. As of August 2005, the Executive Secretariat was composed of the following seven people:

- Karen Banks, Association for Progressive Communication
- Steve Buckley, AMARC
- Bruce Girard, Comunica
- Myriam Horngren, CRIS/WACC Network and Advocacy Coordinator
- Randy Naylor, WACC
- Sean O'Siochru, Nexus Research
- Pradip Thomas, WACC

The Executive Secretariat reflects and embodies the most critical organizational alliances underlying the campaign; that is, its composition mirrors the early partners of the Platform for Democratization of Communication in 1996. The basic division of labor is clear: resources and administrative support are provided by WACC, including a full-time staff member (Horngren). Campaign director Sean O'Siochru provides strategic leadership and is a central node in the network of civil society, academic, governmental and international organizations that developed around NWICO and the MacBride Roundtables. APC's Banks and AMARC's Buckley ensure that two of the largest and

³¹ "Report of the *Networks & Coalition Family* to the [Civil Society] Bureau," 27 December 2004, <http://www.un-ngls.org/wsis%20N&C%20family%20report2.doc>

most diverse advocacy networks with strong links to civil society actors in the global South are stakeholders in CRIS.

CRIS's 24-member International Organizing Committee (IOC) is supposed to provide oversight of and guidance to the Executive Secretariat. (See Appendix 2) It is described as "an overall guarantor of the CRIS aims and principles in the campaign strategies and activities." Its main functions are: to define, approve and participate in the evaluation of the campaign's activities; to elect the members of the Executive Secretariat; to be the final reference for financial and activity reporting of the campaign. The group incorporates representatives of member organizations and CRIS local networks as well as willing individuals who are prepared to commit resources to the campaign. The members are all volunteers; and it is unclear who selected them or how people are added or taken off.

Processes

Looking beyond WSIS, the CRIS Campaign now thinks of itself as an associative framework for articulating the efforts of transnational and national NGOs and individual advocates under the banner of communication rights. As a basic requirement to join the campaign, prospective participants are required to endorse and sign the CRIS Charter, a call for action that outlines the principles and goals of the campaign.³² The CRIS Charter is composed of four "Pillars of Communication":

- Creating Spaces for Democratic Participation
- Reclaiming the Use of Knowledge and the Public domain
- Reclaiming Civil Rights in Communication
- Securing Equitable and Affordable Access

Seán Ó Siochrú has written that even though national and local struggles in communication and information policy are still vital, it is in the international institutional domain that the CRIS Campaign must demonstrate leadership. "Many key issues are now fought out on the global stage as the role of the WTO grows, powerful global media corporations gain ever greater control, and nations lose their regulatory sovereignty and indeed the will to act against the media powers that be" (Ó Siochrú, forthcoming, p.1).

³² The CRIS Charter <http://www.crisinfo.org/content/view/full/98/2>

The state actor's "will to act" is something that the campaign endeavors to help revitalize, provide options for, and help influence. Prodding institutions and state actors to move to policies that reflect shared strategies, which some are calling "multistakeholder governance," is an important process goal for the CRIS Campaign. Targeting domestic actors (both state and civil society) in their own conditions becomes a means of influencing their positions at the international level. The reformist agenda pursued by CRIS is contingent however on its ability to constructively participate in international arrangements like the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). Since 2004, the Campaign has also focused a great deal of attention on the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.

Local or regional CRIS campaigns are often constituted through a validation workshop held by the Global Governance Project. At these events, domestic and/or regional activists and advocates meet with CRIS international committee members to critically deliberate on the GGP framework and attempt to affirmatively answer the normative questions it poses. The local constituting processes often include previously constituted NGOs and citizen groups already active as part of domestic or regional social movements. The NGOs PlanetPaz leads the way in Colombia, for example. Earlier this year, Brazilian NGOs began their validation exercises with a speed and effectiveness that surprised even CRIS secretariat members. Another recent validation effort was held in the Philippines, where the process was sponsored by the Foundation for Media Alternatives. Entitled "Interrogating Communication Rights: Philippine Spaces for Articulation and Action", the validation workshop included not only civil society organizations, but academics, media and government officials. The GGP was represented by Chat Garcia-Ramilo of the Women's Networking Support Programme of APC. The validation workshops are also aimed at producing advocacy training materials for communication rights activists in the pilot countries.

The IOC sets-up a variety of working groups, for example the GGP working group for the pilot domestic CRIS campaigns, and the working group on cultural diversity to plan

advocacy around the current drafting of the UNESCO's Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions. Out of the latter emerges another structural element, the MediaTradeMonitor, a web site to gather resources about the debate between communication and cultural rights and international trade. Initially a wiki, the site is now database-driven. It syndicates content and is promoted as "a concrete tool to get others organized."³³

IOC also is responsible for CRIS Active, a list that serves signatories of the charter who are actually actively engaged in CRIS Campaign activities and who offer tangible support to the campaign. This summer there was much deliberation about the possibility of accrediting individuals and NGOs to become "active" members. For all intents and purposes, it is the CRIS intranet.

Additionally, CRIS also maintains the following lists: CRIS information (regular updates about CRIS activity and the WSIS process serving 524 members, primarily in English, with archives), CRIS USA (connected to the wiki for its archives and linked to the activities of the MediaTradeMonitor), CRIS América Latina, a Latin America list with 541 members, primarily in Spanish, with archives); CRIS Youth (for issues like polymedia labs at CRIS and CRIS related events); and CRIS Chat (a non-mediated list intended allow discussion of issues featured on the other lists not directly pertaining to WSIS).

Social Network Analysis of the CRIS Campaign

Social network analysis confirms that the CRIS Campaign is a very prominent factor in WSIS civil society network. Of the 24 actors on the Executive Secretariat and the International Organizing Committee, 17 emerged in our mapping of the interpersonal connections among the WSIS-centered civil society network, including all seven of the Executive Secretariat.

³³ Comment by Sasha Constanza-Chock at meeting of the working group on cultural diversity, held at the World Social Forum(?), July 22, 2004.

Figure 3 (below) depicts the individuals associated with the CRIS Campaign within the network; nodes are delineated by color (CRIS actors are red), shape (representing region³⁴) and size (larger representing higher degree centrality). Most are Europeans and North Americans, with Canadians outnumbering US citizens in the latter category. Actors A.4 and A.67 are central figures in the WSIS civil society network overall, as well as in the CRIS Campaign. Other important actors in the CRIS campaign include A.47, A.73 and A.68.




Figure 3: CRIS actors in the context of WSIS civil society network

In this diagram, CRIS actors are clustered together as a distinct part of the WSIS civil society network, maintaining relatively short geodesic path distances between one another. Statistical tests indicate that CRIS actors are more connected with each other and also to non-CRIS actors than would be expected under a random distribution of ties between nodes. Even when central actor A.4 is removed from the CRIS Campaign group,

³⁴ Europe (squares), North America (circle-in-squares), Asia (up triangles), Middle East (down triangles), Latin America (down triangles), Africa (circles), Unknown (crosses)

this observation holds (See Appendix 3). This stands in contrast to the other actors (i.e., not associated with the CRIS Campaign) who are less connected to each other than would be expected. This reinforces the observations made in section 3 about WSIS as a mobilizing structure for CRIS. It is also consistent with organizational behavior observations that individuals engaged in new projects tend to form relationships with those whom they have developed strong working relationships in the past (Hinds, et al., 2000). It is also indicative that the Campaign is well connected within the WSIS civil society network and potentially maintains a high level of influence within the UN-sponsored WSIS context.

In addition to the differences in groups with respect to the distribution of ties between nodes, Campaign actors also exhibited significantly higher degree centrality, eigenvector and betweenness scores (see Table 1, below). Given these structural characteristics, CRIS actors theoretically serve as central intermediaries or gatekeepers of information within the WSIS civil society network and can be viewed as potentially influential in shaping transnational civil society’s responses to CIP issues. It is important to note, however, that a large amount of the difference in betweenness scores (a proxy for information sharing) is attributable to actor A.4.

Measure of Centrality	Including Actor A.4		Without Actor A.4	
	Difference in Means	Two-Tailed Test	Difference in Means	Two-Tailed Test
Degree	1.867	0.0001	1.537	0.0002
Eigenvector	10.323	0.0001	7.66	0.0006
Closeness	0.411	0.0462	0.393	0.0942
Betweenness	4.431	0.0001	2.819	0.0019

Table 1: Summary of t-Test for Differences in Means between CRIS and non-CRIS Actors

Figure 4 (below) presents the WSIS civil society network using principal components layout of 2-mode data – this includes actors and their relationships to organizations they cited as important to their work.³⁵ Instead of describing the network along a single

³⁵ Pendants (i.e., those nodes with degree of one) have been removed for clarity.

issue areas (e.g., A.4, APC). Interestingly, the CRIS Campaign itself (O.76) and the Heinrich Boell Foundation (O.36) sit in the cleavage between the two areas, with CRIS well connected to media oriented individuals associated with the NWICO and other past efforts and drawn almost singularly toward the middle of the figure by actor A.4's numerous connections to internet governance and privacy related individuals and organizations. The structure of the network is indicative of the relative disconnect between the CRIS Campaign and communications rights focused advocates and the issue of Internet governance, which has dominated the second phase of the WSIS.

Budget and Funding

According to the CRIS Campaign website, they receive support, both financial and in-kind, from the Ford Foundation, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED), the World Association for Christian Communicators (WACC), and GreenNet. While the North American based Ford Foundation is well known for its private support of communications and information policy advocacy, the others are somewhat less familiar. GreenNet Ltd, a U.K. based ISP which hosts the CRIS Campaign website, is directed by Karen Banks and is an original member of the APC network. WACC is an ecumenical association focused on mass media issues related to diversity, access, justice and equity. Founded in 1968, it is composed of organizations and individuals from 115 countries. EED is a German religious foundation concentrating on fair trade and other globalization issues in the developing world. A membership organization of several churches and church associations, it was founded in 1999. EED maintains strong ties to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), receiving nearly 60% or more of its operating budget from them.³⁶

Ultimately, it is Ford and EED that provide the majority of financial support to the CRIS Campaign. Their funds have been distributed through WACC to regional and national grassroots organizations. In 2003, WACC received almost half of its grant receivables from EED; totaling over €1M. Similarly, WACC received a €123,683 restricted funding

³⁶ In 2003, this amounted to €2.6M, or 64% of its operating budget. The remaining budget is generated by donations made to member churches and other fund-raising campaigns. For more information see <http://www.eed.de/en.home/en.2004/en.2004.statistik.woher/index.html>.

grant from the Ford Foundation for CRIS related activities (specifically, the Global Governance Project).³⁷ From this, smaller grants were made directly to some signatories to the CRIS charter, including ALAI-Ecuador (€14,240), which likely supported country-specific activities related to the CRIS Campaign.³⁸ As the CRIS Campaign matured it began to receive funds directly, including €45,000 in 2005 from WACC to be used to develop its website as a portal site for communication rights activists world-wide.³⁹

Conclusion

In many aspects, the CRIS Campaign exhibits strong structural capacity. It is understandably well connected within the WSIS context, given its early role in the process and long history of key individuals. However, certain weaknesses are visible, namely the lack of numerous interpersonal connections to emerging issue areas such as Internet governance. This is exacerbated by the prevalence of ties to similar individuals, which may result in groups that are more prone to groupthink and less receptive to ideas from outsiders. (e.g., Janis, 1982)

It remains to be seen whether CRIS's post-WSIS strategy of making the Campaign the focal point for continued communications and information policy advocacy will work. Without the ongoing mobilizing structure of something like WSIS, campaigns oriented to achieve collective action across multiple organizations are difficult to sustain. However, CRIS's deep historical ties among its principal actors, its committed activists and ideological agenda, may allow it to continue to grow.

³⁷ See page 43, World Association for Christian Communications (2003). Annual Report. Available at <http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/content/download/232/1236/file/Annual%20Report%202003.pdf>

³⁸ See page 15, World Association for Christian Communications (2003). Accounts Report, Companies House.

³⁹ See page 61, World Association for Christian Communications (2005). Project List. Available at <http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/content/download/222/1162/file/waccprojectlist2005.pdf>

Appendix 1

The essential human rights of a Universal Declaration on the Right to Communicate would be:

“INFORMATION RIGHTS such as:

- The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
- The right to hold opinions.
- The right to express opinions without interference by public or private parties.
- The right of people to be properly informed about matters of public interest.
- The right of access to information on matters of public interest (held by public or private sources).
- The right to access public means of distributing information, ideas and opinions.

CULTURAL RIGHTS such as:

- The right to promote and preserve cultural diversity.
- The right to freely participate in the cultural life of one's community.
- The right to practise cultural traditions.
- The right to enjoy the arts and the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.
- The right to the protection of national and international cultural property and heritage.
- The right to artistic, literary and academic creativity and independence.
- The right to use one's language in private and public.
- The right of minorities and indigenous people to education and to establish their own media.

*PROTECTION RIGHTS such as:

- The right of people to be protected against interference with their privacy by the media of mass communication, or by public and private agencies involved with data collections.
- The protection of people's private communications against interference by public or private parties.
- The right to respect for the standard of due process in forms of public communication.
- The right of protection against forms of communication that are discriminatory in terms of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin
- The right to be protected against misleading and distorted information.
- The right of protection against the systematic and intentional propagation of the belief that individuals and/or social groups deserve to be eliminated.
- The right of the protection of the professional independence of employees of public or private communication agencies against the interference by owners and managers of these institutions.

*COLLECTIVE RIGHTS such as:

- The right of access to public communication for communities.
- The right to the development of communication infrastructures, to the procurement of adequate resources, the sharing of knowledge and skills, the equality of economic opportunities, and the correction of inequalities.

- The right of recognition that knowledge resources are often a common good owned by a collective.
- The right of protection of such resources against their private appropriation by knowledge industries.
- *PARTICIPATION RIGHTS such as:
 - The right to acquire the skills necessary to participate fully in public communication.
 - The right to people's participation in public decision making on the provision of information, the production of culture or the production and application of knowledge.
 - The right to people's participation in public decision making on the choice, development and application of communication technology."⁴⁰ (Hamelink, 2002)

⁴⁰ Keynote at the Opening Session of the Civil Society Sector Meeting at the Prepcom 1 for the World Summit on the Information Society, July 1, 2002, Geneva.

Appendix 2

CRIS International Organizing Committee

Alain Ambrosi, GCNP, Canada;
Alice Munya, Femnet, Kenya;
Astrid Vellegas, Planeta Paz and CRIS Colombia, Colombia;
Bill McIver, Canada;
Bruce Girard, Uruguay;
Cees Hamelink, The Netherlands;
Claudia Padovani, CRIS Italy, Italy;
Hans Klein, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA;
Jim McDonnell, Signis, United Kingdom;
Jose Luis Aguirre, CRIS Bolivia, Bolivia;
Karen Banks, APC, United Kingdom;
Marc Raboy, Canada;
Margaret Gallagher, United Kingdom;
Murali Shanmugavelan, Panos London, United Kingdom;
Nestor Busso, ALER, Argentina;
Pradip Thomas, WACC, United Kingdom;
Randy Naylor, WACC, United Kingdom;
Sally Burch, ALAI, Ecuador;
Sean O'Siochru, Nexus, Rep of Ireland;
Sergei Stafeev, CCNS, Russia;
Steve Buckley, AMARC, United Kingdom;
Victor Van Oeyen, The Netherlands

Appendix 3

CATEGORICAL AUTOCORRELATION: JOIN-COUNT STATISTICS

 This is test of network data similar to a Pearson Chi-square test of independence, it tests to determine if there is a group effect present (i.e., a departure from what would be observed under a random distribution of ties between advocates in the network).

Adjacency dataset: C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\My Academic Stuff\Ford Foundation\Phase Two\Working Documents\JCS\lmode_aAttribute: lmode_a_Centrality col 4
 # of Permutations: 10000
 Random seed: 21493

Warning: Row Attribute vector has been recoded. Here is a translation table:

Old Code	New Code
0	=> 1 (non CRIS advocates)
1	=> 2 (CRIS advocates)

Number of iterations = 10000

	1	2	3	4	5
	Expected	Observed	Difference	P >= Diff	P <= Diff
1 1-1	483.717	393.000	-90.717	1.000	0.000
2 1-2	44.330	108.000	63.670	0.001	1.000
3 2-2	0.953	28.000	27.047	0.000	1.000

The first row ("1-1"), tells us that, under the null hypothesis that ties are randomly distributed across all actors in the CIP network (i.e., being part of a specific group makes no difference), we would expect 484 ties to be present in the non CRIS block of advocates. We actually observe fewer ties, 90 less to be precise. A negative difference this large essentially never occurred in graphs where the ties were randomly distributed. Based on this, we can say that the non CRIS advocate network exhibits fewer ties between actors than would be expected under a random distribution.

The second row ("1-2"), shows a significant difference ($p > .001$) between the number of ties observed between the non CRIS and CRIS advocate groups and what would be expected by chance under a null hypothesis of no effect of shared group membership on tie density. CRIS advocates have more ties to the rest of the CIP advocate network than expected. Even when controlling for specific actors (e.g., A.4), the same result holds.

The third row ("2-2") indicates that the observed amount of ties between CRIS actors (28) is much greater than expected by chance. The difference would almost never be observed if the null hypothesis of no group effect on the probability of ties were true.

TOOLS>STATISTICS>T-TEST

 Dependent variable: lmode_a_Centrality col 1
 Independent variable: lmode_a_Centrality col 4
 # of permutations: 10000
 Random seed: 23132

Basic statistics on each group.

		1	2
	Group 1	Group 2	
1	Mean	0.619	2.486
2	Std Dev	0.967	1.939
3	Sum	230.412	42.268
4	Variance	0.936	3.758
5	SSQ	490.754	168.987
6	MCSSQ	348.039	63.894

```
7 Euc Norm    22.153  13.000
8 Minimum     0.258   0.258
9 Maximum     5.155   7.474
10 N of Obs   372.000  17.000
```

SIGNIFICANCE TESTS

Difference in Means	...One-Tailed Tests...		Two-Tailed Test
	Group 1 > 2	Group 2 > 1	
-1.867	1.000	0.000	0.0001

Running time: 00:00:01
Output generated: 12 Sep 05 15:59:54
Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Analytic Technologies

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